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ABSTRACT 
 
We investigate whether changes in economic inequality affect mortality in rich countries. 
To answer this question we use a new source of data on income inequality: tax data on 
the share of pretax income going to the richest 10 percent of the population in Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK, and the US between 1903 and 2003. Although this measure is not a 
good proxy for inequality within the bottom half of the income distribution, it is a good 
proxy for changes in the top half of the distribution and for the Gini coefficient. In the 
absence of country and year fixed effects, the income share of the top decile is negatively 
related to life expectancy and positively related to infant mortality. However, in our 
preferred fixed-effects specification these relationships are weak, statistically 
insignificant, and likely to change their sign. Nor do our data suggest that changes in the 
income share of the richest 10 percent affect homicide or suicide rates. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Do changes in economic inequality lead to changes in mortality rates? More than 
100 articles on this question have been published over the past two decades, but no 
consensus has emerged (Lynch et al, 2004a). One major reason has been the paucity of 
reliable historical data on income inequality. As a result, most studies have examined the 
relationship between inequality and mortality at a single point in time. Because income 
inequality and mortality are likely to have common causes that cannot all be measured, 
the cross-sectional relationship between inequality and mortality is unlikely to provide an 
unbiased estimate of how changes in income inequality affect mortality. 
We investigate this issue using a new source of data on economic inequality: the 
share of personal income received by the richest 10 percent of adults in Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK, and the US. We have annual data covering an average of 62 years 
per country. As a result, we can control both year and country fixed effects, thereby 
holding constant both stable country-to-country differences and annual changes in 
mortality that affect all countries in the same year. 
Deaton (2003) and Lynch et al (2004a) have recently surveyed the literature on 
economic inequality and mortality. Both reviews conclude that although there are 
plausible reasons for anticipating a relationship between inequality and mortality, the 
empirical evidence for such a relationship is weak. We have found only five studies that 
use time series from developed countries to analyze the inequality-mortality relationship. 
After examining changes in life expectancy in the United Kingdom during the twentieth 
century, both Wilkinson (1989) and Sen (1999) conclude that longevity rose faster when 
the income gap between the rich and poor narrowed. However, their measures of income 
inequality are relatively inexact, and they do not try to take account of temporal variation 
in the effect of technological innovation. Focusing on the last decades of the twentieth 
century in both the US and the UK, Wilkinson (1996) also argues that rising inequality 
during the 1980s was the main reason why the decline in infant mortality slowed between 
1975 and 1985. Deaton and Paxson (2001), in contrast, find no systematic relationship 
between inequality and health in either the UK or the US from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1990s. Likewise, when Lynch et al (2004b) look at 100-year national trends and 30-year 
regional trends in the US, they find little evidence of a causal relationship between 
income inequality and mortality.  
This paper extends previous studies by examining long time series for twelve of 
the world’s richest countries rather than one or two. Our findings are consistent with 
those of Deaton and Paxson (2001) and Lynch et al (2004b), not with those of Wilkinson 
(1989 and 1996) or Sen (1999).  In our preferred specifications we find only small and 
statistically insignificant relationships between income inequality and mortality.  This 
holds true regardless of whether we measure mortality using life expectancy at birth, 
infant mortality, homicide, or suicide. It also holds true when we introduce lagged 
measures of inequality, when we focus exclusively on the period since 1960, when we 
control both the educational level of the population and health expenditures. Our findings 
suggest that the relationship between income inequality and mortality is either non-
existent or too fragile to show up in a robustly estimated panel specification. The paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of the relationship between 
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inequality and health. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 presents our results. Section 
5 concludes. 
 
2. A simple model of the relationship between inequality and health 
Epidemiologists and social scientists have proposed numerous mechanisms by 
which income inequality might affect an individual’s health.  We can group these 
mechanisms under three broad headings: absolute income, relative income, and society-
wide effects of income inequality. We discuss these mechanisms in turn.  
The absolute income hypothesis.  Even if health depends only on individual 
income, standard economic models predict that the health gains from an extra unit of 
income should diminish as income rises. Figure 1 shows a stylized version of such a 
relationship. A mean-preserving transfer from the richer individual (R) to the poorer 
individual (P) raises the health of P by more than it lowers the health of R. Holding total 
income constant, therefore, a more equal distribution of income should improve 
population health.  
When one compares countries, the relationship between average income and 
average life expectancy follows the pattern shown in Figure 1 (Preston 1975; Deaton 
2003). The relationship is almost flat among countries with incomes more than half the 
US average. When one compares individuals within the US, the relationship between 
family income and age-specific mortality again exhibits this pattern (Backlund et al, 
1996). However, neither the comparisons of countries nor the comparisons of individuals 
take account of all the factors that could affect both income and mortality.  Nor do they 
take account of reverse causation (poor health lowers income). Thus while there are 
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strong theoretical reasons for expecting additional income to have less effect on health as 
income rises, the empirical evidence supporting this assumption is not conclusive. 
The relative income hypothesis. Holding individual income constant, the income 
of others can affect people’s health if they evaluate either their income or their lives as a 
whole by comparing themselves to others. The relative income hypothesis assumes that, 
at least in the economic domain, upward comparisons are more salient than downward 
comparisons and that upward comparisons are more likely to be stressful than soothing.1 
Wilkinson (1997) argues, for example, that if individuals assess their well-being by 
comparing themselves to others with more income than themselves, increases in 
economic inequality will engender “[l]ow control, insecurity, and loss of self esteem.” 
When upward economic comparisons are distressing, they are said to produce “relative 
deprivation.”  The most frequently suggested physical mechanism linking relative 
deprivation to mortality is chronic stress, which appears to lower resistance to many 
forms of disease in a variety of species.2  
One potential problem objection to this hypothesis is that many studies of relative 
deprivation suggest that social comparisons are most stressful when they involve people 
who have a lot in common, such as co-workers, relatives, and neighbors.3 Income 
differences within such reference groups are likely to be much smaller than differences 
between random members of national populations. Nonetheless, when income inequality 
changes in society as a whole, it is also likely to change in the same direction within 
                                                 
1 Upward comparisons can be soothing if they lead people whose current economic circumstances are 
stressful to think that their future circumstances could be better. We are not aware of any persuasive 
evidence on whether upward economic comparisons are more salient than downward comparisons or on 
whether they are more often upsetting than soothing. 
2 Marmot (2005) provides numerous references. 
3 Martin (1981) provides some relevant references for earnings. 
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reference groups composed of co-workers, relatives, or neighbors. If such changes lead to 
increases in chronic stress, increased inequality at the national level could increase 
mortality and decreased inequality could reduce mortality.4   
Society-wide effects of inequality 
a) Violent crime.  Fajnzylber et al (2002) report a robust relationship between 
economic inequality and violent crime in a sample of rich and poor countries. Violent 
crime accounts for a tiny fraction of all deaths in the countries we study, but it could have 
larger second-order effects on mortality if it increases chronic stress among those who 
worry that they or their kin might become victims in the future.   
b) Public spending: If the Meltzer-Richard theorem is correct, greater economic 
inequality among voters should make the median voter more inclined to support 
government spending on health (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Szreter (1988) shows, for 
example, that clean water was made available in much of the UK only after the franchise 
was extended to include the less affluent, for whom public spending on sanitation 
provided large health benefits at little cost to themselves.5  However, Alesina, Baqir and 
Easterly (1999) show that the average value of public goods to members of a community 
will decrease when heterogeneity increases. If income inequality makes voters’ 
preferences more heterogeneous, it could lower government spending on health for that 
reason as well. In addition, increases in economic inequality may allow the rich buy more 
political influence, which could lead to reductions in government spending on health.   
                                                 
4 The relative income hypothesis also comes in a more extreme variant, where all that matters is ordinal 
rank, not the distance between ranks. In that variant any income hierarchy in which every individual has a 
unique income has the same effect as any other.  
5 The social capital and public expenditure channels do not posit any specific link between an individual’s 
position in the income distribution and his or her health. Instead, they suggest that greater variance of 
incomes will adversely affect population health. This impact could conceivably affect individuals whose 
income is below, above, or at the mean. 
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c) Social capital and trust:  Comparing American states, Kawachi et al (1997) 
find negative cross-sectional relationships both between inequality and social capital and 
between social capital and mortality. Other studies have also found that people in more 
unequal places tend to be less trusting (Knack and Keefer 1997; Alesina and LaFerrara 
2002; Leigh 2006a). Low trust may make voters more skeptical about the claim that 
public spending will improve health. Low trust may also be linked to thinner friendship 
networks, which are associated with higher age-specific mortality (Berkman and Syme, 
1979). 
Because this paper relies entirely on aggregate data about income inequality and 
mortality, it cannot distinguish empirically between the absolute income hypothesis, the 
relative income hypothesis, and hypotheses that involve society-wide effects of 
inequality. One way to see this is to combine the absolute and relative income hypotheses 
algebraically. Following Gravelle, Wildman and Sutton (2002), we begin by assuming 
that absolute individual income, y, is the only factor affecting an individual’s mortality 
risk, m(y). The expression m(y) can be expressed in terms of individual income y and 
mean income y  through the following second order approximation: 
2))(("
2
1))((')()( yyymyyymymym −+−+≈     (1) 
We now introduce the relative income hypothesis. Deaton (2001) shows that 
under plausible assumptions an individual’s experience of relative economic deprivation 
depends on the fraction of total income received by individuals’ with higher incomes. He 
also shows that when that is the case the mean level of relative deprivation will be a 
linear function of the Gini coefficient for household income.  Here, however, we follow 
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Gravelle et al. and assume that the mean level of relative deprivation is a linear function 
of the variance of income, V(y), rather than the Gini coefficient. 
)())(("
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Taking expectations of each side:  
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which simplifies to: 
)()()("
2
1)()( yEVyVymymyEm α++≈      (4) 
Equation (4) shows that: 
• If both the second derivative of mortality with respect to individual income and α 
(the effect of income inequality via relative deprivation) are positive, there will be 
a positive relationship between mortality and inequality, V(y). 
• Unless we can estimate m'' using micro data, separating the contributions of 
absolute and relative income to the overall relationship between income inequality 
and mortality will be impossible.6  
Our analysis therefore focuses on reduced-form models that estimate the net effect of a 
change in income inequality on various measures of mortality.   
As Gravelle et al. (2002) point out, one recurrent problem when estimating the 
relationship between economic inequality and health is that we cannot be certain whether 
any particular measure of inequality captures the full effect of inequality on health. There 
is no consensus on which dimensions of economic inequality are most likely to affect 
                                                 
6 Miller (2001) has shown that this argument holds only if the second-order approximation in equation 1 is 
exact. But while the second-order approximation is unlikely to be exact, we would need much better data 
than we have to distinguish the two effects.      
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population health, but most investigators prefer measures such as the Gini coefficient that 
are sensitive to changes in income shares at both the top and bottom of the distribution.7 
We use the income share of the top decile because it gives us far more observations per 
country than any previous study. However, this choice is not costless. As we shall see, 
our measure of inequality is a reasonable proxy for other changes in the top half of the 
distribution, but it is not a good proxy for changes in the bottom half of the distribution. 
We return to this issue in Section 3. 
One final concern is worth noting. Since adults are less likely to work when they 
are sick or have to care for sick children, countries with worse overall health may have 
more unequal family incomes for that reason alone. The causal links between inequality 
and health can therefore run either from health to inequality or from inequality to health. 
With a long time series such as ours, we could use Granger causality tests to see whether 
lagged inequality affected current health or lagged health affected current inequality. But 
since we find no statistically significant relationship between inequality and health, we do 
not pursue this approach. 
 
3. Data on inequality and health 
Data quality has been a major problem in studies of the relationship between 
income inequality and health. As Judge, Mulligan and Benzeval (1998:569) note in their 
review of the literature: 
 
                                                 
7 Exceptions are Waldmann (1992), who uses the share going to the richest 5 percent and Wilkinson (1992) 
who uses the share going to the poorest 60 percent. 
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“Many of the studies use multiple sources of income distribution data and/or 
data from a wide range of years, which makes comparability between countries 
questionable. Only five of the studies use data based on a measure of equivalent 
disposable income. In fact, we believe it is the generally poor quality of the 
income data that poses the most serious weakness in most of the studies we have 
reviewed.”  
Most cross-national studies have used measures of inequality from the Deininger 
and Squire dataset or the World Income Inequality Database (WIID). Atkinson and 
Brandolini (2001) have shown that using higher-quality inequality data can substantially 
alter results based on these two sources. Judge et al. use data from the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS), which provides a more consistent measure of income for all 
countries and years, namely disposable household income adjusted for household size. 
They find no significant relationship between inequality and either life expectancy or 
infant mortality. However, their sample includes only 16 countries, and only ten of these 
countries have data for more than one year. Even if there were a causal relationship 
between inequality and health, it would be hard to detect in samples this small, 
particularly if one tries to control other relevant factors.  
In order to get more precise estimates we need more observations over longer 
periods of time in more countries. Annual estimates of the share of pretax income 
received by the richest 10 percent of the population (abbreviated as Share 10) are now 
available for twelve rich countries, with an average of 62 years per country. Table 1 
shows the periods covered in each country. The estimates are derived by comparing the 
amount of income reported to the tax authorities by the richest 10 percent of households 
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to as estimate of total personal income in the same year taken from each country’s 
national accounts (see Leigh 2006b).8 Both the numerator and the denominator of this 
ratio are, of course, subject to error, especially in the years before 1945, when estimates 
of national income are not very precise.  
Our measure of inequality is particularly sensitive to changes at the top of the 
distribution. Regressing the share going to the top 10 percent on the share going to the 
top 1 percent in a specification that includes country and year fixed effects, the 
coefficient of the top 1 percent share is 1.35 (t=35.0). However, changes in the share 
going to the top 10 percent also predict changes in the 90-50 ratio. Leigh (2006b) 
regresses the income share of the top 10 percent on LIS measures of inequality, which are 
largely derived from household surveys and are then processed in a consistent way. When 
country and year fixed effects are included, the log of the top decile’s share of pretax 
income is strongly related to the log of the 90/50 ratio for size-adjusted post-tax income 
in LIS (β = 0.843; t=6.7). The logged share of the top 10 percent is also fairly strongly 
related to the log of the LIS Gini coefficient for size-adjusted post-tax income (β = 0.610; 
t = 5.6). However, the share going to the top 10 percent is not related to the log of the 
50/10 ratio in LIS (β = -0.077; t =-0.4).  
We use two standard measures of population health: life expectancy at birth and 
infant mortality. Life expectancy in a given year measures the weighted probability that 
individuals of different ages died in that year, with deaths at younger ages getting more 
weight than deaths at older ages. Infant mortality is the proportion of children under the 
                                                 
8 Leigh (200b) provides data for 13 countries. Here, we exclude Japan because information on the income 
share of the top 10 percent is unavailable. See also the comparable database in Atkinson and Piketty 
(forthcoming). 
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age of one who died in a given year (excluding still-births). Because infant mortality 
asymptotes towards zero as population health improves, we use its logarithm as our 
dependent variable. Infant mortality and life expectancy are highly correlated, partly 
because infant mortality has a direct effect on life expectancy and partly because they 
have common causes. Regressing life expectancy on log infant mortality in a 
specification with country and year fixed effects, the coefficient on log infant mortality is 
-6.68 (t=-11.5). Without country and year fixed effects, R2 is 0.89.  
All our specifications control real per capita GDP, measured in 1990 International 
Geary-Khamis dollars. A few specifications also control the average educational 
attainment of the adult population, the log of per capita government spending on health 
spending, and the log of per capita private spending on health (in constant US dollars). 
The last three measures are not available until 1960.  
Infant mortality, life expectancy, homicide, suicide, and our measure of inequality 
(Share 10) are interpolated when they are missing for short periods, but they are not 
extrapolated to beyond the earliest or latest available year. Our other control variables are 
not only interpolated when they are missing for short periods but extrapolated forward 
when they are missing in the last few years of our time series. The Data Appendix gives 
further details on variable construction. Table 2 presents summary statistics. 
Figures 2, 3 and 4 show trends in inequality and health for each country. Share 10 
varies more at the end of the 20th century than earlier, while life expectancy varies less at 
the end of the twentieth century than earlier. The log of infant mortality shows no clear 
trend. Figures 5 and 6 show the cross-sectional relationship between inequality and 
mortality in 1995, which is the last year for which all 12 countries had reported these 
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statistics. For life expectancy, the cross-sectional gradient is negative but statistically 
insignificant. For infant mortality, the gradient is positive but statistically insignificant.  
 
4. Empirical strategy and results  
Most of the existing literature relies on comparisons across countries at a single 
point in time or on changes over time within one or two countries. We begin by 
estimating an equation similar to the one often reported in this literature:  
mjt = α + β(Share10)jt + γZjt + εjt      (5) 
 
where m is a measure of mortality (life expectancy or infant mortality) for country j in 
year t, Share10 is the income share of the richest 10 percent of the population, Z is real 
GDP per capita, and ε is an error term. Standard errors are clustered at the country level 
to take account of possible within-country serial correlation. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 present results from this specification, which does not 
include country or year fixed effects. For both life expectancy and infant mortality, 
higher inequality is associated with significantly higher mortality. This accords with 
Waldmann (1992), who finds a strong positive relationship between infant mortality and 
the income share of the richest 5 percent of the population in a cross-sectional regression.  
However, there are good reasons to think that we need to take account of country-
specific and time-specific factors. We therefore move progressively towards estimating 
an equation of the following form: 
mjt = α + β(Share10)jt + γZjt + δj + ρt + εjt     (6) 
in which δ is a country fixed effect, and ρ is a year fixed effect.  
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 Country fixed effects capture stable mortality differences between countries. 
Column 3 of Table 3 shows that adding country fixed effects barely alters the coefficient 
of Share 10 in the life expectancy equation. Evidently the unobserved country 
characteristics that produce stable differences in life expectancy are not strongly 
correlated with economic inequality.  However, Column 4 shows that introducing country 
fixed effects appreciably reduces the estimated effect of Share 10 on infant mortality. 
Because adding country fixed effects also reduces the standard errors in the infant 
mortality equation, the coefficient on Share 10 remains highly significant.    
Year fixed effects capture the influence of shocks that affect mortality in multiple 
countries at the same time.  Examples might include major influenza epidemics, the 
spread of HIV/AIDS, the introduction of new vaccines, and the diffusion of antibiotics.9  
Adding year fixed effects makes the relationship between Share 10 and life expectancy 
both substantively and statistically insignificant (see Column 5). Adding year fixed 
effects also cuts the apparent effect of Share 10 on infant mortality, although the 
coefficient is still significant at the 5% level (see  Column 6).  
Columns 7 and 8 include both country and year fixed effects simultaneously. Both 
country and year fixed effects remain highly significant, but the coefficient on Share 10 is 
now small and insignificant for both life expectancy and infant mortality. Indeed, the 
coefficient on Share 10 in the life expectancy equation changes its sign. The coefficients 
                                                 
9 Technological innovations do not, of course, reach all developed countries in exactly the same year. 
Deaton and Paxson (2001) argue, for example, that technological innovations tend to affect the UK about 
four years later than the US. However, we cannot allow year fixed effects to vary randomly by country, 
since they would then explain all of the variation we use to identify the effect of changes in inequality. 
However, our results are robust to excluding the years 1914-19 and 1939-45, which are the periods in 
which year effects vary most across countries. 
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on Share 10 do not become insignificant because their standard errors increase. (The 
standard errors in columns 7 and 8 are smaller than those in columns 1 and 2.) Rather, the 
coefficients on Share 10 become insignificant because they are very close to zero once 
we add country and year fixed effects. The coefficients without fixed effects are also well 
outside the 99 percent confidence intervals for the coefficients with fixed effects 
(compare columns 1 and 2 to columns 7 and 8).10
Table 3 shows that even with 744 country-year observations the relationship 
between income inequality and mortality is not robust to including both country and year 
fixed effects. This finding suggests that time-series correlations between inequality and 
mortality in studies of only one or two rich countries may be inflated by unobserved 
factors that affect both inequality and mortality in many rich countries simultaneously.11
Table 4 presents several sensitivity tests. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 are identical 
to columns 7 and 8 of Table 3. Columns 3 and 4 show that when we add GDP2 to the 
basic specifications in columns 1 and 2, GDP2 is significant for both life expectancy and 
infant mortality. Its sign indicates that the protective effect of additional GDP diminishes 
as GDP rises, which is consistent with the cross-sectional results in Preston (1975) and 
Deaton (2003). However, including GDP2 does not change our conclusions about the 
effect of income inequality. The coefficient on Share 10 remains insignificant, and the 
sign is now reversed for both life expectancy and infant mortality. 
                                                 
10 In principle, our approach of including state and country fixed effects is similar to that of Judge, 
Mulligan and Benzeval (1998). Their Table 5 analyzes changes in the ten countries for which they have 
two estimates of inequality: Australia 1981-85, Belgium 1985-88, Canada 1981-87, Finland 1987-90, 
France 1979-84, Netherlands 1983-87, Norway 1979-86, Sweden 1981-87, UK 1979-86, and US 1979-86. 
We have top incomes data for seven of these countries (Australia, Canada, France, Netherlands, Sweden, 
UK and US). We estimated the correlation between changes in life expectancy and changes in the top 10 
percent share in these seven countries using the same time intervals as Judge et al. The correlation between 
∆LE and ∆S10 was 0.227 (95% CI: -0.635 to 0.837), while the correlation between ∆IM and ∆S10 was -
0.663 (95% CI: -0.945 to 0.180). 
11 For a discussion of the same issue in a different context, see Acemoglu et al (2005). 
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 One potential objection to the results presented thus far is that the time series may 
actually be “too long.”  We know that the proximate causes of mortality changed 
dramatically over the course of the twentieth century, and the effects of economic 
inequality could have changed as a result. In England and Wales, for example, infectious 
diseases accounted for 55 percent of all deaths in 1901, but only 18 percent in 1961 
(McKeown et al., 1975). This epidemiologic transition, which occurred throughout the 
developed world, accounted for most of the increase in life expectancy between 1901 and 
1961.  Once it was complete, increases in life expectancy slowed and became largely 
dependent on progress in reducing mortality from degenerative conditions like heart 
disease and cancer.  If income inequality affected mortality from infectious and 
degenerative diseases differently, combining data for these two periods could be 
misleading. 
Columns 5 and 6 drop the years prior to 1960, leaving only the 430 country-year 
observations between 1960 and 2003. Because annual changes in life expectancy are 
smaller after 1960 than before, the coefficients in equation 5 are both smaller and more 
precisely estimated than those in equation 3. Nonetheless, the coefficient of Share 10 is 
still insignificant and still has the “wrong” sign. Nor does variation in the rate of growth 
in GDP have a significant effect on life expectancy after 1960 in these rich countries.12  
 Because we log the infant mortality rate, its variance does not fall as the absolute 
rate approaches zero.  The coefficient of Share 10 when predicting infant mortality is 
larger in the post-1960 sample than in the full sample, but the point estimate still suggests 
                                                 
12 The point estimate is actually negative once per capita GDP exceeds $17,000 in 1990 dollars – a level 
that most countries in this sample had achieved by 1990. 
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that increases in income inequality are more likely to be associated with reductions in 
infant mortality than with increases, and the confidence interval still includes zero. GDP 
and GDP2 are also still significant.  In short, we find no clear evidence that the effect of 
either GDP or income inequality on either life expectancy or infant mortality looks 
different when we focus on the years since 1960 than when we look at a longer time 
period.    
Columns 7 and 8 include both public and private health expenditures, as well as 
the mean number of years of schooling completed by the adult population.  Adding these 
potentially endogenous controls does reduce the absolute size of the coefficients on Share 
10, especially when predicting life expectancy.  But since the confidence intervals of all 
the relevant coefficients include zero, the most parsimonious explanation is that all these 
changes are due to random noise.  
The models in Tables 3 and 4 treat the relationship between income inequality 
and mortality as if it were almost instantaneous. Although the literature on inequality and 
mortality often makes this assumption, it is not entirely plausible. Some of the hypotheses 
we have discussed do suggest that the lag between a change in inequality and a change in 
mortality could be quite short. If inequality were positively related to violent deaths, for 
example, the mortality effect might show up in the same year as the income change, 
although any second-order effects on levels could take longer to kill people. Likewise, if 
rising inequality leads to a decline in the absolute income of the poor, mortality might 
rise in the same year, especially among newborns.13  But some of the hypotheses we have 
discussed suggest that the lag between a change in inequality and a change in mortality 
                                                 
13 Because our measure of income inequality is not a good proxy for the absolute income of the poor, we 
would not be likely to detect this particular effect even if it existed. 
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could be fairly long. If inequality affects health by weakening the social fabric or by 
intensifying feelings of relative deprivation, for example, these effects could take some 
years to influence mortality.   
To assess the importance of lags we estimate a variant of equation (6) that 
includes inequality lagged by n years: 
mjt = α + β(Share10)jt-n + γZjt-n + δj + ρt + εjt     (7) 
We estimate equation 7 using various combinations of lags, ranging from 1 to 5 
years. Table 5 presents regressions using 1-year lagged inequality (columns 1 and 2), 1-
year and 2-year lagged inequality (columns 3 and 4) and 1-year through 5-year lagged 
inequality (columns 5 and 6). Table 6 repeats this exercise including lagged GDP and 
GDP2. In each case we estimate the linear sum of the Share 10 coefficients, which is a 
summary measure of the overall impact of lagged inequality on current mortality. Using 
only 1-year lags, we find no statistically significant relationship between inequality and 
mortality. When we include multiple lagged terms, specific lags are sometimes 
statistically significant, but their implied effects are offset by the fact that other lags have 
the opposite sign. Summing 1-year and 2-year lags, or 1-year through 5-year lags, we 
found no significant relationship between inequality and mortality.  
Overall, we find no robust relationship between changes in current mortality and 
changes in economic inequality over the past five years. The coefficients of the controls, 
in contrast, mostly accord with expectations. Increases in GDP are associated with 
increases in life expectancy and reductions in infant mortality.  Both effects diminish as 
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GDP rises.  Increases in public and private health spending are associated with lower 
mortality, but the coefficients are not statistically significant.14   
Some researchers have suggested that even if there is no relationship between 
inequality and overall mortality, there may be a relationship between inequality and 
homicide (Deaton 2003; Lynch et al 2004a) or suicide (Lynch et al 2004b). To test this 
hypothesis we calculated annual homicide and suicide rates for each country starting in 
1950, which is the first year in which such data are available for our full sample. The 
Data Appendix provides details on variable construction. Figures 7 and 8 depict our 
homicide and suicide series. 
Table 7 shows the relationship of Share 10 to the homicide and suicide rates per 
100,000 people. As with infant mortality, we log of the homicide and suicide rates, since 
they must asymptote towards zero. We tested their relationship to Share 10 using fixed 
effects specifications, with levels, with 1-year lags, and with 5-year lags. The coefficient 
of inequality was always negative, suggesting that more inequality was associated with a 
lower suicide or homicide rate. For homicide, the negative relationship was statistically 
significant at the 5 or 10 percent level, depending upon the specification. Overall, the 
results in Table 7 are inconsistent with the hypothesis that higher top income shares lead 
to more homicide or suicide. 
 
5. Conclusion 
While there is a strong consensus in the literature that the correlation between 
income and health is positive, there is much less agreement about the relationship 
                                                 
14 We find no systematic relationship between changes in adult educational attainment and changes in 
population health once we control GDP. However, year-to-year changes in the educational attainment of 
the adult population are inevitably small and may not be well measured. 
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between income inequality and health. This paper has used a new measure of inequality – 
the income share of the richest 10 percent of the population – to test the relationship 
between inequality and mortality. Because we have longer time series for more countries 
than past studies, we have tried to circumvent some of the problems that plagued these 
studies by holding constant country and year fixed effects.  
We have shown that higher GDP is associated with lower mortality, and that this 
effect declines as GDP rises. Without country and year fixed effects, we also find that 
more inequality is associated with higher mortality. But once we include country and year 
fixed effects the relationship between inequality and health becomes small and 
statistically insignificant.  This finding is consistent with a number of other careful cross-
country papers, such as Judge et al. (1998) and Deaton and Paxson (2001).   
The confidence intervals around our estimates are sufficiently tight to make 
substantively important detrimental effects of inequality on population health unlikely. 
Consider the coefficients from the levels specifications controlling GDP and GDP2, 
shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4. For life expectancy, the 95 percent confidence 
interval for the effect of a one percentage point increase in the income share of the top 10 
percent includes no negative values larger than -0.1 years. This result implies that even a 
10-point increase in the income share of the top decile would be unlikely to lower life 
expectancy by more than 1 year. For infant mortality, the upper bound of the 95 percent 
confidence interval is 0.01 (an additional 0.2 deaths per 1000, when evaluated at the 
mean).  Our confidence intervals do not allow us to rule out the possibility that inequality 
raises life expectancy by a substantively significant amount. But because there is not 
much evidence for this hypothesis elsewhere in the published literature, and because our 
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confidence intervals include zero, a claim that growing inequality reduces mortality 
would be hard to defend. 
The most important limitation of our findings is that we may not have measured 
the type of inequality that affects mortality. While changes in the top decile’s share of 
pretax income are a reasonably good proxy for changes in both the 90-50 ratio and the 
Gini coefficient, changes in the top decile’s share are not a good proxy for the 50/10 
ratio. If the effects of inequality on mortality derive from the fact that increased 
inequality slows or reverses the long-term increase in living standards among the poor, 
our data would not detect this effect.  
With the possible exception of the absolute income hypothesis, however, the 
theories we reviewed about how income inequality might affect mortality were not 
limited to households near the bottom of the income distribution. Relative deprivation, 
for example, can affect people anywhere in the income distribution except the very top, 
as long as long as they compare themselves to others who have even more money.  The 
same is potentially true for the societal effects of violence or the effects of economic 
inequality on social networks and trust. If changes in inequality within the top half of the 
distribution do not affect mortality, these theories may need to be reconsidered.  Three 
possibilities deserve consideration:  
1. The absolute income hypothesis, the relative income hypothesis, and the 
hypotheses linking inequality to society-wide changes that affect mortality are all 
false.  
2. The absolute income hypothesis is true only for those near the bottom of the 
income distribution in rich countries, and the other hypotheses are either false or 
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have countervailing effects, so that their net impact on population health is 
negligible.  
3. The absolute and relative income hypotheses are both true, but the adverse effects 
of inequality on mortality that they predict are offset by other societal effects of 
inequality that reduce mortality.  
We cannot distinguish between these possibilities with the data analyzed in this paper.  
 21
Data Appendix 
 
Treatment of Germany 
All series for Germany are for West Germany for 1956 to 1991, and for reunified 
Germany from 1992 onwards. 
 
Sources of top incomes data 
Top incomes data are from Leigh (2006b), who adjusts top incomes series from 13 
different papers to produce a comparable data set. Note that in Australia, Canada and 
Spain, the tax unit is the individual throughout the period of analysis, while in France, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States, the tax unit is a married 
couple or single individuals throughout the analysis. Germany has a hybrid system, with 
most taxpayers filing as tax units, and the very rich filing as individuals. New Zealand, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom all switched from household to individual filing. Where 
this appears to have caused substantial breaks in continuity, Leigh (2006b) adjusts the top 
incomes series to take account of the changes. 
 
Sources of life expectancy data  
Most of our data on life expectancy at birth is taken from the Human Mortality Database 
(HMD), found at www.mortality.org. There are three exceptions: 
• US data are from the National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol.52, No.14, February 18, 
2004, Table 12 (found at www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/dvs/mortdata.htm). For 
1900-28, the figures are from death-registration states only. From 1929 onwards, they 
cover the entire US. 
• Australian data are from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Historical 
Population Statistics, ABS Catalog Number 3105.0.65.001, Table 48. 
• Figures for Ireland are from Central Statistics Office (2004), Irish Life Tables No. 14, 
2001-2003 (available at www.cso.ie). 
 
The following should also be noted: 
• In the case of New Zealand, life expectancy from the HMD is available for 1937 
onwards for Maori, non-Maori, and the total population, and from 1876 onwards for 
non-Maori only. We use the ratio of Maori to non-Maori life expectancy in 1937 and 
1938 to form a consistent life expectancy series for the entire population from 1876-
1936. This method assumes that the ratio of Maori to non-Maori life expectancy was 
the same in the pre-1937 period as in 1937-38. 
• Although our inequality data cover the entire United Kingdom (including Ireland prior 
to 1921), the HMD only provides mortality figures for England and Wales (omitting 
Scotland and Northern Ireland). For the period 1999-2002, we update the HMD figures 
using National Statistics, “Life expectancy at birth by health and local authorities in the 
United Kingdom 1991-1993 to 2001-2003, including revised results for England and 
Wales 1991-1993 to 2000-2002” (available at www.statistics.gov.uk). For consistency, 
we continue to use only figures from England and Wales in 1999-2002. 
• Life expectancy is linearly interpolated for missing years (but not extrapolated). 
 
Sources of infant mortality data 
 22
The infant mortality rate is measured as probability that a baby born live does not survive 
until its first birthday. This figure is typically expressed as a rate per 1000 births, and we 
follow this convention.  
 
Most infant mortality data is taken from the Human Mortality Database (HMD), found at 
www.mortality.org. We use the tables Life Tables by Year of Death (1x1), and calculate 
infant mortality as q(x)*1000 for x=0, where q(x) is the probability of death between 
exact ages x and x+1. There are three exceptions: 
• US infant mortality is from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table No. 
HS-13. Live Births, Deaths, Infant Deaths, and Maternal Deaths: 1900 to 2001. Prior 
to 1960, this excludes Alaska and Hawaii. Beginning 1970, it excludes births to, and 
deaths of, nonresidents of the United States. 
• Australian data are from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Historical 
Population Statistics, ABS Catalog Number 3105.0.65.001, Table 46. 
• Irish data is from Vital Statistics, 2001 Annual, p.137 
 
Additionally: 
• New Zealand data prior to 1937 are adjusted in the same manner as for life 
expectancy. 
• UK infant mortality data only covers England and Wales. 
• Infant mortality for missing years is interpolated log-linearly (but not extrapolated). 
 
Sources of Homicide and Suicide Data 
Homicide and suicide figures are from the World Health Organization Mortality 
Database (4 March 2005 update), available from www3.who.int/whosis/mort/. This 
database tabulates deaths by country back to 1950, classified according to the prevailing 
International Classification of Diseases system (ICD7-ICD10). Homicide and suicide 
rates are both expressed as rates per 100,000 people. Since the coding changes over time, 
it is useful to set out the precise ICD codes that were used here.  
Homicide: A149 and B050 from ICD7; A148 and B050 from ICD8; B55 from ICD9; 
1102-1103, X85-X99, and Y00-Y09 from ICD10. 
Suicide: A148 and B049 from ICD7; A147 and B049 from ICD8; B54 from ICD9; 1101 
and X60-X84 from ICD10 
 
In missing years, homicide and suicide rates are linearly interpolated for all countries (but 
not extrapolated). For Australia and the US, we checked the WHO figures against those 
from the national statistical agencies, and found very little difference between the two 
series. WHO homicide figures for Switzerland are not credible for the period 1995-2001, 
so we drop these years from our analysis.  
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GDP 
GDP is real GDP per capita (measured in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars), 
from Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (2003). Downloaded 
from www.ggdc.net/Maddison/. Maddison’s series end in 2001, and we extrapolate 
linearly for 2002-03 where necessary. 
 
Educational attainment 
Educational attainment is the average number of years of schooling for the population 
aged 15 and over, from: Barro, R.J. and Lee. J.W. 1993. “International Comparisons of 
Educational Attainment” Journal of Monetary Economics 32: 363-394; Barro, R.J. and 
Lee, J.W. 1996. “International Measures of Schooling Years and Schooling Quality” 
American Economic Review 86: 218-223; and Barro, R.J. and Lee, J.W. 2000. 
“International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications” Center for 
International Development Working Paper 42. Cambridge, MA: CID. 
 
Barro and Lee provide figures every 5 years from 1960-2000, and we linearly interpolate 
for intervening years (and linearly extrapolate after 2000). Data can be downloaded from 
www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html. 
 
Health expenditure 
Health expenditure is from OECD Health Data 2004 (updated September 24, 2004), 
downloaded from www.oecd.org/health/healthdata. We use two variables, public health 
expenditure per capita, and private health expenditure per capita (created as real total 
health expenditure per capita minus real public health expenditure per capita). Both are 
supplied by the OECD database in US$ (converted at purchasing power parity). We then 
adjust for inflation by converting these amounts into 2003 dollars using the CPI-U-RS. 
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Figure 1: A Non-Linear Relationship Between Income and Health 
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Table 1: Country-years covered by the sample 
Country Number of 
years 
Period(s) 
Australia 61 1942-2002 
Canada 60 1941-2000 
France  81 1905 and 1919-1998 
Germany 38 1961-1998 
Ireland  30 1939-1943 and 1976-2000 
Netherlands  86 1914-1999 
New Zealand  78 1925-2002 
Spain  22 1981-2002 
Sweden 87 1903-1920, 1930-1935 and 1941-2003 
Switzerland 64 1933-96 
United Kingdom 52 1919 and 1950-2000 
United States 85 1917-2001 
Total 744 1903-2003 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 Mean SD N 
Income share of richest 10% 33.693 6.100 744 
Average life expectancy at birth (years) 70.740 6.569 744 
Log infant mortality rate (per 1000 live 
births) 2.879 0.855 739 
Log homicide rate (per 100,000 people) 0.226 0.719 536 
Log suicide rate (per 100,000 people) 2.512 0.375 538 
Real GDP per capita ($1000s) 11.406 5.345 744 
Average years of education of adults aged 
15+ 9.081 1.682 455 
Log real public health spending per capita 
(converted to 2003 $US at PPP) 6.878 0.582 438 
Log real private health spending per capita 
(converted to 2003 $US at PPP) 5.970 0.791 447 
 
 
 
Table 3: Top 10% Share and Health: Levels Specification With and Without Fixed Effects 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Dependent variable: LE IM LE IM LE IM LE IM 
Income share of richest 10% -0.352*** 0.041*** -0.382*** 0.028*** -0.054 0.018** 0.016 0.006 
 [0.077] [0.009] [0.042] [0.006] [0.065] [0.008] [0.067] [0.007] 
Real GDP per capita ($1000s) 0.874*** -0.125*** 0.884*** -0.138*** 0.167 -0.02 0.356* -0.036 
 [0.089] [0.013] [0.068] [0.010] [0.169] [0.018] [0.168] [0.023] 
Country FE? No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
     F-test    9.5*** 21.4***   590,000*** 51,671*** 
Year FE? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     F-test     264*** 573*** 1304*** 64*** 
Observations 744 739 744 739 744 739 744 739 
R-squared 0.76 0.84 0.86 0.94 0.91 0.95 0.96 0.98 
Note:  
1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
2. Dependent variables: LE is average life expectancy at birth, IM is the log of the infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births).  
3. F-test is a test for the joint significance of the country fixed effects or year fixed effects. 
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Table 4: Top 10% Share and Health: Levels 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Dependent variable: LE IM LE IM LE IM LE IM 
Income share of richest 10% 0.016 0.006 0.096 -0.003 0.054 -0.012 0.033 -0.010 
 [0.063] [0.006] [0.089] [0.006] [0.063] [0.010] [0.057] [0.010] 
Real GDP per capita ($1000s) 0.356** -0.036 1.199** -0.138*** 0.199 -0.083** 0.17 -0.075* 
 [0.156] [0.021] [0.522] [0.042] [0.124] [0.032] [0.119] [0.036] 
Real GDP per capita squared ($1000s)   -0.027* 0.003** -0.006 0.002** -0.005 0.002** 
   [0.014] [0.001] [0.004] [0.001] [0.004] [0.001] 
Average years of education       -0.332 -0.050 
       [0.288] [0.028] 
Log real public health spending per capita       0.105 -0.049 
       [0.234] [0.044] 
Log real private health spending per capita       0.295 -0.050 
       [0.285] [0.083] 
Country & year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 744 739 744 739 430 430 430 430 
R-squared 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Note:  
1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
2. Dependent variables: LE is average life expectancy at birth, IM is the log of the infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births).  
3. Columns 5 and 6 are restricted to those country-years for which education and health spending variables are available.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Top 10% Share and Health: Lags 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Dependent variable: LE IM LE IM LE IM 
Income share of richest 10% (t-1) 0.011 0.006 0.177 0.002 0.162 0.001 
 [0.066] [0.007] [0.144] [0.008] [0.141] [0.009] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-2)   -0.188 0.003 -0.163** 0.004* 
   [0.116] [0.007] [0.073] [0.002] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-3)     -0.057 0.002 
     [0.041] [0.004] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-4)     0.013 0.003 
     [0.069] [0.006] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-5)     0.033 -0.007 
     [0.112] [0.009] 
Real GDP per capita ($1000s) (t-1) 0.339** -0.037 0.641* -0.006 0.601* -0.021 
 [0.149] [0.023] [0.348] [0.025] [0.296] [0.023] 
Real GDP per capita ($1000s) (t-2)   -0.321 -0.033 -0.173 0 
   [0.295] [0.028] [0.183] [0.020] 
Real GDP per capita ($1000s) (t-3)     0.005 0.003 
     [0.157] [0.009] 
Real GDP per capita ($1000s) (t-4)     0.098 -0.014 
     [0.205] [0.011] 
Real GDP per capita ($1000s) (t-5)     -0.28 -0.007 
     [0.223] [0.024] 
Country & year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 742 736 725 720 680 678 
R-squared 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.95 0.98 
Sum of lagged inequality coefficients   -0.010 (0.068) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.11 
(0.083) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
Note:  
1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. None of the sums of lagged coefficients are 
statistically significant. 
2. Dependent variables: LE is average life expectancy at birth, IM is the log of the infant mortality rate 
(per 1000 live births).  
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Table 6: Top 10% Share and Health: Lags 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Dependent variable: LE IM LE IM LE IM 
Income share of richest 10% (t-1) 0.083 -0.004 0.263* -0.008 0.260* -0.012** 
 [0.090] [0.007] [0.138] [0.005] [0.128] [0.005] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-2)   -0.201* 0.003 -0.164* 0.004 
   [0.105] [0.009] [0.082] [0.003] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-3)     -0.049 0.001 
     [0.042] [0.004] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-4)     0.019 0.003 
     [0.065] [0.004] 
Income share of richest 10% (t-5)     0.002 -0.005 
     [0.094] [0.008] 
Real GDP per capita ($1000s) (t-1) 1.112** -0.141** 3.127** -0.234*** 3.120*** 
-
0.282*** 
 [0.502] [0.047] [1.023] [0.054] [0.872] [0.048] 
Real GDP per capita ($1000s) (t-2)   -2.018** 0.082 -1.359* 0.113*** 
   [0.654] [0.058] [0.685] [0.033] 
Real GDP per capita ($1000s) (t-3)     0.348 -0.036* 
     [0.349] [0.019] 
Real GDP per capita ($1000s) (t-4)     -0.076 0.005 
     [0.609] [0.022] 
Real GDP per capita ($1000s) (t-5)     -1.017*** 0.028 
     [0.200] [0.027] 
Real GDP per capita squared ($1000s) 
(t-1) -0.025* 0.003** -0.110** 0.010*** 
-
0.106*** 0.011*** 
 [0.014] [0.001] [0.036] [0.002] [0.030] [0.002] 
Real GDP per capita squared ($1000s) 
(t-2)   0.089*** -0.007** 0.055** 
-
0.005*** 
   [0.027] [0.003] [0.025] [0.001] 
Real GDP per capita squared ($1000s) 
(t-3)     -0.014 0.002 
     [0.012] [0.001] 
Real GDP per capita squared ($1000s) 
(t-4)     0.007 -0.001 
     [0.021] [0.001] 
Real GDP per capita squared ($1000s) 
(t-5)     0.043*** 
-
0.003*** 
     [0.009] [0.001] 
Country & year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 742 736 725 720 680 678 
R-squared 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.98 
Sum of lagged inequality coefficients   0.062 (0.085) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
0.068 
(0.086) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
Note:  
1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. None of the sums of lagged coefficients are 
statistically significant. 
2. Dependent variables: LE is average life expectancy at birth, IM is the log of the infant mortality rate 
(per 1000 live births).  
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Table 7: Top 10% Share and Homicide/Suicide 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Dependent variable: HOM SUI HOM 
(1 yr lag) 
SUI 
(1 yr lag) 
HOM 
(5 yr lag) 
SUI 
(5 yr lag) 
Income share of richest 10%  -0.043* -0.021 -0.045** -0.021 -0.042* -0.018 
 [0.020] [0.012] [0.020] [0.012] [0.019] [0.011] 
Real GDP per capita ($1000s) -0.065 0.073 -0.074 0.073 -0.084 0.034 
 [0.060] [0.063] [0.061] [0.068] [0.048] [0.051] 
Real GDP per capita squared ($1000s) 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Country & year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 536 538 538 541 531 538 
R-squared 0.91 0.85 0.91 0.85 0.91 0.84 
Note:  
1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
2. Dependent variables: HOM is the log of the homicide rate per 100,000 people; SUI is the log of the 
suicide rate per 100,000 people 
3. For lagged specifications (columns 3-6), all independent variables are lagged over the same interval. 
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